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INTRODUCTION 
Many EU citizens have been living under the 
impression that the European Union has been in 
crisis over the last decade. The outcome of the 
Brexit referendum in June 2016 triggered a 
debate on the Future of Europe with 27 
remaining Member States. This debate presents 
the Union with new opportunities to further 
Many EU citizens have been living under the 
impression that the European Union has been in 
crisis over the last decade. The outcome of the 
Brexit referendum in June 2016 triggered a 
debate on the future of Europe with 27 
remaining Member States. This debate presents 
the Union with new opportunities to further 
complete its ongoing political project and to 
achieve its goals as codified in the Treaties.  
Without a convincing narrative, the European 
project is threatened by extinction. It runs the 
risk of being misrepresented by populists and 
may no longer be embraced by its citizens. As 
this Policy Brief will explain, this narrative 
should not only focus on practical cooperation 
in areas where there is a will to work together 
and where this work can deliver tangible results, 
but also on the values that underpin the 
institutions on their trajectory to find new 
solutions to concrete concerns of EU citizens. 
EUROPE IN POLY-CRISIS 
The EU’s recent worries all started with a 
banking crisis that in some Member States 
developed into a full-fledged sovereign debt 
crisis, and which brought down the economy to 
its worst level of recession since the creation of 
the bloc. It raised serious doubts about the 
Many observers may easily reach the 
conclusion that the European Union (EU) 
has been in crisis for the last decade. 
Against this background, and especially 
since the outcome of the Brexit referendum, 
the EU has begun much soul searching to 
carve out a new path to its future. This 
Policy Brief addresses the current Future of 
Europe debate with the Bratislava 
Roadmap, the Rome Declaration, the 
Leaders’ Agenda, and other valuable 
contributions. It raises the question what 
kind of narrative the European project will 
need to survive into the future. What kind of 
Europeans do we wish to be and what sort 
of Europe do we want to create? Despite 
growing mistrust of citizens in their own 
institutions and rising populism, this Policy 
Brief pleads for enduring support for the 
values on which the European project is 
built. These values should remain beacons 
for the way in which we legitimise, organise 
and communicate the work of the EU. Even 
if we cannot always agree on a common 
destination, Europeans should be able to 
agree at least on a shared trajectory based 
on common values. This is a narrative that 
should inspire Europe again. 
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survival of its currency, the euro, and put 
question marks over the EU’s prosperity. 
 
In addition, the bloc has witnessed influxes of 
both regular and irregular migrants, escaping 
from political and economic turmoil due to crop 
failures, conflicts, persecution and violence, 
which find their cause in revolutions elsewhere, 
such as in Libya and Syria. The reception and 
integration of these new entrants provoke tense 
political discussions in the EU and its Member 
States, creating unease in traditional political 
parties pressurized by an anti-immigration 
discourse. 
 
More to the East, Russia caused a stir by 
annexing the Crimea and freezing conflicts 
related to the EU’s growing influence in Ukraine 
and other members of the Eastern Partnership. 
In response to this and in a spirit of solidarity 
the EU adopted economic sanctions, but the 
panic about Russia’s behaviour is still palpable. 
This has become obvious from the way in which 
the EU takes steps to beef up its own security 
environment and to reorganize its gas supply.1 
 
In June 2016, the UK’s 40 years old love-hate 
relationship with the process of further 
European integration took a dramatic turn. A 
narrow majority of UK citizens voted in a 
referendum to leave the EU, and in doing so, 
ousted David Cameron as Prime Minister. At 
their meeting of 28 June 2016, the European 
leaders discussed the outcome of the 
referendum and a new crisis mood got hold of 
Brussels. The new UK government led by 
Theresa May notified the European Council of 
the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU in 
March 2017, paving the way for Brexit 
negotiations. Whilst these negotiations have 
helped until now the consensus-building on the 
EU’s own stance, much insecurity remains about 
the long-term implications for both parties. 
 
A fifth and final crisis can be found in how 
some European governments, perhaps also in 
response to the aforementioned crises, are 
showing their resolve by undermining the Rule 
of Law in their democracies. They seem to 
deliberately overstep norms and values so as not 
to be perceived as weak and to cater to populist 
demands for strong and firm answers. Yet this is 
particularly challenging for the EU as an 
international organisation where sovereignty is 
shared on the basis of the rule of law. The 
questioning of these norms and values thus 
holds great danger for the entire European 
construction. 
FROM CRISIS TO OPPORTUNITY 
With that many crises it is hard to imagine that 
no disruption would come from them. But with 
each funeral a mourning process starts and the 
question the Union rightly asked, was how to 
overcome its loss and how to manage it. The 
EU suffered serious injury, yet it suffices in 
those circumstances to show more resilience to 
turn things around. 
 
Brexit was probably the trigger the EU needed 
to pick up the pieces. This does not mean that 
all will end well. The odds of a cliff edge 
scenario are still very high. There is still too 
much uncertainty about the kind of future 
relationship that London aspires to achieve and 
whether its aspiration will be reconcilable with 
the EU’s own political and legal order. For the 
time being, the group of remaining 27 Member 
States is remarkably holding together. This show 
of firm unity became apparent at the 60th 
anniversary of the Rome Treaty with the 
message that the EU had to take its destiny in its 
own hands.2 With the ensuing adoption of its 
Leaders’ Agenda, the European Council exactly 
did that.3 
 
Also the election of Donald Trump as the 45th 
president of the USA served as a catalyst. Since 
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the 1950s Europe has tried to build its own 
defence community, but so far never succeeded. 
The absence of an unwavering commitment by 
the US to Europe’s security at the NATO 
summit in Brussels of June 2017, has led to 
PESCO and EDIDP.4 Trump’s economic 
nationalism even accelerated the political deal 
making between Japan and the EU on a wide-
ranging economic partnership agreement 
announced in July 2017 and concluded the same 
year in December.5 The same argument counted 
for the speedy conclusion of a new EU-Mexico 
trade deal.6 These are just the most visible 
examples that Europe is willing and ready to 
turn the page. 
ONE ENGINE WITH MULTIPLE GEARS 
After having licked their wounds, the remaining 
27 members quickly developed a more positive 
agenda about the future.7 The questions this 
future raises are what the 27 still would like to do 
together, how they could accomplish their 
common objectives, and with whom they still 
could further integrate. Since several decades the 
European integration process has been 
developed at different speeds and with variable 
partners. The most obvious example is the 
Eurozone which currently counts 19 out of 28 
Member States. The principle of a multispeed 
Europe was also inscribed in the Rome 
Declaration where it says: “act together, at 
different paces and intensity where necessary, 
while moving in the same direction”.8 
 
Whether we like it or not, the concept of 
multispeed integration has evolved into a 
cornerstone of the European construction, and 
it explains very well what the EU is not. It is not 
a (federal) state. Though it can be argued that 
the European Central Bank and the European 
Banking Authority have received wide-ranging 
competences like federal agencies, they remain 
exceptions to the rule. In principle, Union law 
must be implemented by Member States, not by 
agencies. 
 
We must therefore be very careful not to 
misrepresent the EU as a (federal) state, because 
it creates an enormous capabilities-expectations 
gap. Whilst for some politicians the gap is an 
important argument to plead for a federal 
European state, other political groups will be 
quick to use the misrepresentation to pinpoint 
the inefficiency of the EU institutions. By way 
of example, both groups will probably argue that 
the so-called European Border and Coast Guard 
(FRONTEX) is highly inefficient. Whereas the 
former will probably explain that Europe’s 
borders cannot be protected by 1.500 people 
alone, the latter will carefully omit that it is 
currently the Member States, and not 
FRONTEX, that are competent and thus 
responsible for border protection.9 It is always 
important to carefully examine the instruments 
in the EU’s toolbox before blaming it unfairly of 
running itself in an inefficient way. 
 
If the EU should not be presented as a federal 
state or empire, what is it then? It is an 
international organisation of Member States 
codified by several treaties. The Member States 
of this organisation voluntarily sacrificed part of 
their sovereignty by conferring competences 
into a Union and its institutions in order to 
pursue common objectives. In order to achieve 
these objectives, the Union created a new 
supranational legal order legitimised by both 
national and European democratic processes. 
The whole construction is based on the rule of 
law, of which the European philosophical and 
political origins go back centuries. It cannot be 
more difficult to explain the EU than Belgian 
federalism. Both represent unfinished political 
projects, and just like any other car, they have 
one engine and multiple gears. If one does not 
use these gears safely, the entire engine will blow 
up. 
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DIFFICULT TO FALL IN LOVE WITH 
If we accept that the EU is a political 
construction and less of an emotional home, the 
question remains whether and how future 
generations of Europeans can stay attached to it. 
The internal market, although fundamental for 
the prosperity of European citizens, is 
something many people have difficulty 
identifying with. Besides, it is often crushed by 
its critics for being a cold, neoliberal place. It 
may therefore not come as a surprise that some 
groups plead for a social dimension to give the 
EU a more human face. It is still too soon to tell 
whether the social pillar will be able to bear 
fruit.10 At the same time, we must remain 
cautious that this fruit will not become too 
heavy, causing another branch of the European 
tree to break off. 
 
What is undoubtedly true, however, is that the 
European construction needs a convincing 
narrative to survive. The degree of 
sentimentalism can of course vary. We must 
show understanding for the evolving degrees of 
someone’s affection for Europe. After all we are 
dealing here with an ongoing political project of 
international cooperation. But Europe needs to 
be in our minds at least, if not in our hearts. 
Some intelligence of the heart is crucial, or else 
the project will die. Without such a narrative, 
there is a serious risk that people will no longer 
embrace the project. 
IN SEARCH OF A NARRATIVE 
Until the Union was struck by its poly-crisis, the 
most important inspirational source of the 
European project had been the bloc’s reputation 
as a guarantor of peace and prosperity in the 
decades after World War II. After some success 
stories, such as the integration of a reunified 
Germany and some countries of the fragmented 
Balkan region, this image has come under 
pressure as a result of some frivolous military 
adventures, e.g. in Libya, and the failed attempt 
to integrate Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic 
rules-based order. The deep economic recession 
in the past decade also brought about a feeling 
of insecurity, which inevitably led to the fear of 
further decline and even fear of change. It 
profoundly questioned the foundations of trade 
liberalisation and the effects of globalisation. 
Consequently, the narrative of future prosperity 
and security for the European project has been 
tarnished. The EU is patching this up with new 
initiatives, but it will need more time to restore 
citizens’ trust in domains of physical and 
economic security.11 
 
It was no coincidence that the informal 
European Council in Gothenburg also 
considered culture and youth as possible 
avenues to renew Member States’ vows to the 
European project.12 Our common European 
heritage can serve as a reference point to find 
the narrative we may need for the future. 
Europe has a rich repertoire of cultures, ideas 
and principles. The Renaissance and the Age of 
Enlightenment are good examples thereof in our 
history. However, it should be stressed that 
these philosophical and artistic currents were 
not the result of one single European culture. 
They were the fruit of many exchanges between 
several European cultures. Unity in diversity is 
rightly the Union’s motto.13 From cultural 
interchange – even when it does not always 
happen in a frictionless way – can sprout 
interwovenness and connectedness between the 
peoples of Europe. Programmes such as 
Erasmus+ convey this important message. 
EUROPE AS A TRAJECTORY 
By selecting a new narrative, we should not 
proclaim Europe as a religious faith, not even by 
harking back to its Judean-Christian origins, nor 
should we impose some high-brow intellectual 
culture on its populations. Those are not the 
kinds of Europe we should strive for, because 
they can never grow into an inclusive project for 
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all EU citizens. Neither should we focus on all 
sorts of ideologies which constantly look for 
great narratives to attract followers to defend 
their own political cause. The narrative for 
Europe could, however, come from a more 
neutral and recognisable symbol. Why not 
simply present Europe as a trajectory?14 
 
If many of us can agree that Europe is a political 
trajectory from one point in history to another, 
then the narrative should focus on a way of 
better legitimising, organising, and 
communicating the work of the EU. It should 
inspire practical cooperation in areas where 
there is a will to work together and where this 
work can deliver tangible results. Even if we 
cannot always agree on a common destination, 
we should at least agree on sharing the same 
road. 
 
The trajectory we have all shared, is that of a 
liberal democracy. This brings us to the 
legitimate question whether the EU is a club of 
liberal democracies. Differences between 
Emmanuel Macron and Jaroslaw Kaczynski are 
perhaps immense, but they are smaller than they 
were between France and Poland before 1989. 
Poland and Hungary are now examples of 
nationalist conservative rule, which is still very 
different from what they were behind the Iron 
Curtain. 
 
The problem is that nativism and negativism 
have gotten hold of part of the European 
electorate. For a politician to change his political 
ideology in the pursuit of power is a story as old 
as democracy itself. The danger coming from 
this populism becomes imminent when its 
political spectacle finds a victim or enemy to 
blame. Faceless immigrants and nameless 
European bureaucrats are among such easy 
targets. 
 
Until now Poland has become the only Art. 7 
TEU battleground against liberal democratic 
backsliding.15 But as other general elections have 
shown recently, the problem is not 
geographically limited to one part of the EU. If 
the remaining 27 Member States decide to stay 
on the EU trajectory together, they should 
better also choose a set of beacons to demarcate 
their pathway. These beacons can be identified 
as shared values. 
VALUES, VALUES, VALUES 
Generally, actions eroding judicial independence 
and helping loyalists turning media into 
propaganda are undermining common 
European values. And more than on rules and 
laws, democracy is based on values, which 
include liberties such as freedom of expression, 
religion, tolerance, social morals etc. These 
values are – albeit somewhat succinctly and 
hastily – listed in Art. 2 TEU and are the true 
guardians of the European construction. 
 
It is not because these values have been unable 
to solve all our societal challenges that we 
should no longer trust them. It is even 
understandable that EU citizens from time to 
time lose trust in the institutions that govern 
them because their voices are not always heard 
in Europe. More fundamentally, however, they 
should continue to believe that the concrete 
responses to their concerns should always 
respect these values. Let us forever be reminded 
of their importance for humankind. 
 
The strongest European narrative should come 
from these values. As our European ancestors 
shifted their values from tribal, racial or religious 
glory toward more universal human flourishing, 
we cannot satisfy ourselves with fatalism, leading 
to populism and ultimately extremism. When we 
replace religious fanaticism, traditionalism and 
totalitarianism with reason, debate and 
institutions of truth-seeking, we also must 
believe that they can bring progress to humanity. 
What else could be more heroic and glorious for 
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Europe than to believe in the principles of 
Enlightenment to find solutions to new 
problems?16 
LEADING THE WAY AHEAD 
The Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap, the Rome 
Declaration and the Leaders’ Agenda have been 
mentioned already as main contributions to the 
Future of Europe debate.17 All three documents 
outline policy priorities for the EU trajectory. 
Whereas the Rome Declaration provides a long-
term vision, the two other documents focus on 
the short to medium term (6 and 21 months 
respectively) and stay within the time horizon of 
Brexit negotiations and its transitional phase. 
They are also more operational and include less 
strategic elements than the Rome Declaration. 
As far as the Future of Europe is concerned, 
some competition or rivalry could be expected 
from Commission President Juncker’s 2017 State 
of the Union and the Commission’s White Paper on 
the Future of Europe published before the Rome 
Declaration and later accompanied by a series of 
reflection papers published between April-June 
2017.18 Since the adoption of the Leaders’ Agenda 
in September 2017, the Commission has been 
contributing enthusiastically to the Leaders’ 
Meetings as the meetings according to in the 
Leaders’ Agenda are called. As a result, the fate of 
the five scenarios the Commission depicted in 
this white paper and its reflection papers 
remains unclear. The European Council so far 
has not yet taken a position. 
We should not forget the contributions coming 
from Member States either. President Macron’s 
speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017 was 
one of the most comprehensive and widely 
referenced national contribution to the Future 
of Europe debate.19 Another noteworthy 
individual contribution was a speech by the 
Portuguese Prime Minister at the College of 
Europe in Bruges on 15 September 2017.20 In a 
speech on 26 September 2017 the Polish 
President also laid out a vision radically different 
from that of Macron’s at the College of Europe 
in Natolin, Warsaw.21 
In October 2017, the European Parliament also 
contributed to the Future of Europe debate by 
publishing its vision, mainly building on its 
resolutions from earlier that year.22 The same 
month its President, Antonio Tajani, relayed an 
invitation from the European Parliament to the 
Heads of State or Government to present their 
views on the issue in its plenary chamber. 
Numerous leaders accepted this invitation with 
the Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, delivering the 
first such address in Strasbourg in January 2018. 
With this initiative, the European Parliament is 
also providing a democratic and open forum for 
debate. 
According to the Leaders’ Agenda, EU leaders will 
gather in Sibiu for a summit on 9 May 2019 that 
should be more than ceremonial. It has the 
potential to become another milestone to the 
likings of Rome (1957) and Maastricht (1991) 
setting a Strategic Agenda 2019-2024. The Sibiu 
summit will be held less than two weeks before 
the 2019 European Parliament elections, of 
which the results will be decisive for the legacy 
of the Leaders’ Agenda and any strategy set out 
for the Future of Europe after Brexit. The most 
important challenge for the Future of Europe 
remains the defence of the values by which its 
trajectory is demarcated. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The analysis in this Policy Brief is presented 
approximately at the mid-point between the 
Rome Declaration and the Sibiu summit. A time 
where the EU is trying to turn the page of 
multiple crises and the Brexit referendum 
triggered a debate about the Future of Europe. 
A debate which lays bare all the doubts and 
insecurities of the Union, its institutions and its 
citizens. Whereas it is true that we should always 
remain operational and focused on the concrete 
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problems deserving concrete solutions, we must 
at all times respect the values demarcating the 
EU trajectory as an ongoing political project and 
which underpin the institutions looking for 
these solutions. Values should be more than just 
rhetoric. They should be the source of 
inspiration for our practical cooperation. And so 
it is still useful in this day and age to reread the 
preambles of the European treaties, because: “If 
you want to build a ship, don’t drum up the men 
to gather wood, divide the work and give orders. 
Instead, teach them to yearn for the vast and 
endless sea.”23 That is why narratives can make 
such a big difference. Europe should inspire 
again. 
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